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Abstract
It is often claimed that Bayesian methods, in particular Bayes factor methods for hypothesis
testing, can deal with optional stopping. We first give an overview, using only most elementary
probability theory, of three different mathematical meanings that various authors give to this
claim: stopping rule independence, posterior calibration and (semi-) frequentist robustness to op-
tional stopping. We then prove theorems to the effect that — while their practical implications
are sometimes debatable — these claims do indeed hold in a general measure-theoretic setting.
The novelty here is that we allow for nonintegrable measures based on improper priors, which
leads to particularly strong results for the practically important case of models satisfying a group
invariance (such as location or scale). When equipped with the right Haar prior, calibration and
semi-frequentist robustness to optional stopping hold uniformly irrespective of the value of the
underlying nuisance parameter, as long as the stopping rule satisfies a certain intuitive property.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a surprising number of scientific results have failed to hold up to continued scrutiny.
Part of this ‘replicability crisis’ may be caused by practices that ignore the assumptions of traditional
(frequentist) statistical methods (John et al., 2012). One of these assumptions is that the experimental
protocol should be completely determined upfront. In practice, researchers often adjust the protocol
due to unforeseen circumstances or collect data until a point has been proven. This practice, which
is referred to as optional stopping can cause true hypotheses to be wrongly rejected much more often
than these statistical methods promise.
Bayes factor hypothesis testing has long been advocated as an alternative to traditional testing that can
resolve several of its problems; in particular, it was claimed early on that Bayesian methods continue
to be valid under optional stopping (Lindley, 1957, Edwards et al., 1963). In particular, the latter
paper claims that (with Bayesian methods) “it is entirely appropriate to collect data until a point
has been proven or disproven, or until the data collector runs out of time, money, or patience.”. In
light of the replicability crisis, such claims have received much renewed interest (Wagenmakers, 2007,
Rouder, 2014, Schönbrodt et al., 2017, Yu et al., 2013, Sanborn and Hills, 2013). But what do they
mean mathematically? It turns out that different authors mean quite different things by ‘Bayesian
methods handle optional stopping’; moreover, such claims are often shown to hold only in an informal
sense, or in restricted contexts. Thus, the first goal of the present paper is to give a systematic overview
and formalization of such claims in a simple, expository setting; the second goal is to extend the reach
of such claims to more general settings, for which they have never been formally verified.
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Overview and Most Important Result In Section 2, we give a systematic overview of what
we identified to be the three main mathematical senses in which Bayes factor methods can handle
optional stopping, which we call τ-independence, calibration, and (semi-) frequentist. We first do this
in a setting chosen to be as simple as possible — finite sample spaces and strictly positive probabilities
— allowing for straightforward statements and proofs of results.
In Section 3, we extend the statements and results to a much more general setting allowing for a wide
range of sample spaces and measures, including measures based on improper priors. These are priors
that are not integrable, thus not defining standard probability distributions over parameters, and as
such they cause technical complications. Such priors are indispensable within the recently popularized,
default Bayes factors for common hypothesis tests (Rouder et al., 2009, 2012, Jamil et al., 2016).
In Section 4, we provide stronger results for the case in which both models satisfy the same group
invariance. Most (but not all) default Bayes factor settings concern such situations; prominent ex-
amples are Jeffreys’ Bayesian one- and two-sample t-tests, going back to (Jeffreys, 1961), in which
the models are location and location-scale families, respectively. Many more examples are given by
Berger and various collaborators in a sequence of papers (Berger et al., 1998, Dass and Berger, 2003,
Bayarri et al., 2012, 2016) who give compelling arguments for using the (typically improper) right
Haar prior on the nuisance parameters in such situations; for example, in Jeffreys’ one-sample t-test,
one puts a right Haar prior on the variance. Haar priors and group invariant models were studied
extensively by Eaton (1989), Andersson (1982), Wijsman (1990), whose results this paper depends on
considerably. When nuisance parameters (shared by both H0 and H1) are of the right form and the
right Haar prior is used, we can strengthen the results of Section 3: they now hold uniformly for all
possible values of the nuisance parameters, rather than in the marginal, ‘on average’ sense we consider
in Section 3; however — and this is our most important insight — we cannot take arbitrary stopping
rules if we want to handle optional stopping in this strong sense: the stopping rules have to satisfy a
certain intuitive condition, which will hold in many but not all practical cases: a rule such as ‘stop
as soon as the Bayes factor is ≥ 20’ is allowed, but a rule (in the Jeffreys’ one-sample t-test) such as
‘stop as soon as
∑
x2i ≥ 20’ is not.
The paper ends with an Appendix containing all longer mathematical proofs.
Remarks Our analysis is restricted to Bayesian testing and model selection using the Bayes factor
method; we do not make any claims about other types of Bayesian inference. Some of the results we
present were already known, at least in simple settings; we refer in each case to the first appearance in
the literature that we are aware of. The main mathematical novelties in the paper are the results on
optional stopping in the general case with improper priors and in the group invariance case. The main
difficulties here are that, (a), for fixed sample sizes, at least with continuous-valued data, the Bayes
factor usually has a distribution with full support, i.e. its density is strictly positive on the positive
reals, whereas with variable stopping times, the support of its distribution may have ‘gaps’ at which
its density is zero or very near 0; and (b), as indicated, we need certain restrictions on the stopping
times in order for the results to be valid.
Finally, as an important caveat, we point out that the idea that Bayesian methods can handle optional
stopping has also been criticized, for example by Yu et al. (2013), Sanborn and Hills (2013), and also
by ourselves (De Heide and Grünwald, 2018). There are two main issues: first, in many practical
situations, many Bayesian statisticians use priors that are themselves dependent on parts of the data
and/or the sampling plan and stopping time. Examples are Jeffreys prior with the multinomial model
and the Gunel-Dickey default priors for 2x2 contingency tables advocated by Jamil et al. (2016). With
such priors, final results evidently depend on the stopping rule employed; none of the results below
continue to hold for such priors. The second issue is that all mathematical theorems below are just
that, mathematical theorems. For them to have implications for practice, one needs to make additional
assumptions which sometimes may not be warranted. In particular the second sense of ‘handling
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optional stopping’, calibration, relies on an analysis that holds under a Bayes marginal distribution,
assigning probabilities that are really average (expected) probabilities with expectations taken over a
prior. Yet many if not most priors used in practice (such as Cauchy priors over a location parameter)
are of a ‘default’ or ‘pragmatic’ nature and are not really believed by the statistician, making the
practical meaning of such an expectation questionable; De Heide and Grünwald (2018) discuss the
issue at length.
2 The Simple Case
Consider a finite set X and a sample space Ω := X T where T is some very large (but in this section, still
finite) integer. One observes a sample xτ ≡ x1, . . . , xτ , which is an initial segment of x1, . . . , xT ∈ X
T .
In the simplest case, τ = n is a sample size that is fixed in advance; but, more generally τ is a stopping
time defined by some stopping rule (which may or may not be known to the data analyst), defined
formally below.
We consider a hypothesis testing scenario where we wish to distinguish between a null hypothesis
H0 and an alternative hypothesis H1. Both H0 and H1 are sets of distributions on Ω, and they
are each represented by unique probability distributions P¯0 and P¯1 respectively. Usually, these are
taken to be Bayesian marginal distributions, defined as follows. First one writes, for both k ∈ {0, 1},
Hk = {Pθ|k : θ ∈ Θk} with ‘parameter spaces’ Θk; one then defines or assumes some prior probability
distributions pi0 and pi1 on Θ0 and Θ1, respectively. The Bayesian marginal probability distributions
are then the corresponding marginal distributions, i.e. for any set A ⊂ Ω they satisfy:
P¯0(A) =
∫
Θ0
Pθ|0(A)dpi0(θ) ; P¯1(A) =
∫
Θ1
Pθ|1(A)dpi1(θ). (1)
For now we also further assume that for every n ≤ T , every xn ∈ Xn, P¯0(X
n = xn) > 0 and
P¯1(X
n = xn) > 0 (full support), where here as below we use random variable notation, Xn = xn
denoting the event {xn} ⊂ Ω. We note that there exist approaches to testing and model choice
such as testing by nonnegative martingales (Shafer et al., 2011, van der Pas and Grünwald, 2018) and
minimum description length (Barron et al., 1998, Grünwald, 2007) in which the P¯0 and P¯1 may be
defined in different (yet related) ways. Several of the results below extend to general P¯0 and P¯1; we
return to this point at the end of the paper, in Section 5. In all cases, we further assume that we have
determined an additional probability mass function pi on {H0, H1}, indicating the prior probabilities
of the hypotheses. The evidence in favour of H1 relative to H0 given data x
τ is now measured either
by the Bayes factor or the posterior odds. We now give the standard definition of these quantities for
the case that τ = n, i.e., that the sample size is fixed in advance. First, noting that all conditioning
below is on events of strictly positive probability, by Bayes’ theorem, we can write for any A ⊂ Ω,
pi(H1 | A)
pi(H0 | A)
=
P (A | H1)
P (A | H0)
·
pi(H1)
pi(H0)
, (2)
where here as in the remainder of the paper we use the symbol pi to denote not just prior, but also
posterior distributions on {H0, H1}. In the case that we observe x
n for fixed n, the event A is of the
form Xn = xn. Plugging this into (2), the left-hand side becomes the standard definition of posterior
odds, and the first factor on the right is called the Bayes factor.
2.1 First Sense of Handling Optional Stopping: τ-Independence
Now, in reality we do not necessarily observe Xn = xn for fixed n but rather Xτ = xτ where τ is a
stopping time that may itself depend on (past) data (and that in some cases may in fact be unknown
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to us). This may be defined in terms of a stopping rule f :
⋃T
i≥0 X
i → {stop, continue}. τ ≡ τ(xT )
is then defined as the random variable which, for any sample x1, . . . , xT , outputs the smallest n such
that f(x1, . . . , xn) = stop. For any given stopping time τ , any 1 ≤ n ≤ T and sequence of data
xn = (x1, . . . , xn), we say that x
n is compatible with τ if it satisfies Xn = xn ⇒ τ = n. We let
X τ ⊂
⋃T
i=1 X
i be the set of all sequences compatible with τ .
Observations take the form Xτ = xτ , which is equivalent to the event Xn = xn; τ = n for some n and
some xn ∈ Xn which of necessity must be compatible with τ . We can thus instantiate (2) to
pi(H1 | X
n = xn, τ = n)
pi(H0 | Xn = xn, τ = n)
=
P¯1(X
n = xn | τ = n)
P¯0(Xn = xn | τ = n)
·
pi(H1 | τ = n)
pi(H0 | τ = n)
(3)
where we note that, by definition Pj(X
n = xn | τ = n) = P (Xn = xn | Hj , τ = n). Using Bayes’
theorem again, the expression on the right can be further rewritten as:
P¯1(X
n = xn | τ = n)
P¯0(Xn = xn | τ = n)
·
pi(H1 | τ = n)
pi(H0 | τ = n)
=
P¯1(X
n = xn)/P¯1(τ = n)
P¯0(Xn = xn)/P¯0(τ = n)
·
(
P¯1(τ = n)
P¯0(τ = n)
·
pi(H1)
pi(H0)
)
. (4)
Combining (3) and (4) we get:
γ(xn)︷ ︸︸ ︷
pi(H1 | X
n = xn, τ = n)
pi(H0 | Xn = xn, τ = n)
=
β(xn)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P¯1(X
n = xn)
P¯0(Xn = xn)
·
pi(H1)
pi(H0)
(5)
where we introduce the notation γ(xn) for the posterior odds and β(xn) for the Bayes factor based on
sample xn, calculated as if n were fixed in advance.
We see that the stopping rule plays no role in the expression on the right. Thus, we have shown that,
for any two stopping times τ1 and τ2 that are both compatible with some observed x
n, the posterior
odds one arrives at will be the same irrespective of whether xn came to be observed because τ1 was
used or if xn came to be observed because τ2 was used. We say that the posterior odds do not depend
on the stopping rule τ and call this property τ-independence. Incidentally, this also justifies that we
write the posterior odds as γ(xn), a function of xn alone, without referring to the stopping time τ .
The fact that the posterior odds given xn do not depend on the stopping rule is the first (and still
relatively weak) sense in which Bayesian methods handle optional stopping; it was perhaps first noted
by Lindley (1957); another early source is Edwards et al. (1963). Lindley gave an (informal) proof in
the context of specific parametric models; in Section 3.1 we show that the result indeed remains true
for general σ-finite P¯0 and P¯1. We note once again that the result only holds if the priors pi0 and pi1
themselves do not depend on τ , an assumption that is violated in many default Bayesian methods.
2.2 Second Sense of Handling Optional Stopping: Calibration
An alternative definition of handling optional stopping was introduced by Rouder (2014). Rouder calls
γ(xn) the nominal posterior odds calculated from an obtained sample xn, and defines the observed
posterior odds as
pi(H1 | γ(x
n) = c)
pi(H0 | γ(xn) = c)
as the posterior odds given the nominal odds. Rouder first notes that, at least if the sample size
is fixed in advance to n, one expects these odds to be equal. For instance, if an obtained sample
yields nominal posterior odds of 3-to-1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, then it must be 3 times
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as likely that the sample was generated by the alternative probability measure. In the terminology
of De Heide and Grünwald (2018), Bayes is calibrated for a fixed sample size n. Rouder then goes
on to note that, if n is determined by an arbitrary stopping time τ (based for example on optional
stopping), then the odds will still be equal — in this sense, Bayesian testing is well-behaved in the
calibration sense irrespective of the stopping rule/time. Formally, the requirement that the nominal
and observed posterior odds be equal leads us to define the calibration hypothesis, which postulates
that c = P (H1|γ=c)P (H0|γ=c) holds for any c > 0 that has non-zero probability. For simplicity, for now we only
consider the case with equal prior odds for H0 and H1 so that γ(x
n) = β(xn). Then the calibration
hypothesis says that, for arbitrary stopping time τ , for every c such that β(xτ ) = c for some xτ ∈ X τ ,
one has
c =
P (β(xτ ) = c | H1)
P (β(xτ ) = c | H0)
. (6)
In the present simple setting, this hypothesis is easily shown to hold, because we can write:
P (β(Xτ ) = c | H1)
P (β(Xτ ) = c | H0)
=
∑
y∈Xτ :β(y)=c P ({y} | H1)∑
y∈Xτ ;β(y)=c P ({y} | H0)
=
∑
y∈Xτ :β(y)=c cP ({y} | H0)∑
y∈Xτ :β(y)=c P ({y} | H0)
= c.
Rouder noticed that the calibration hypothesis should hold as a mathematical theorem, without giving
an explicit proof; he demonstrated it by computer simulation in a simple parametric setting. Deng et al.
(2016) gave a proof for a somewhat more extended setting yet still with proper priors. In Section 3.2
we show that a version of the calibration hypothesis continues to hold for general measures based on
improper priors, and in Section 4.4 we extend this further to strong calibration for group invariance
settings as discussed below.
We note that this result, too, relies on the priors themselves not depending on the stopping time,
an assumption which is violated in several standard default Bayes factor settings. We also note
that, if one thinks of one’s priors in a default sense — they are practical but not necessarily fully
believed — then the practical implications of calibration are limited, as shown experimentally by
De Heide and Grünwald (2018). One would really like a stronger form of calibration in which (6)
holds under a whole range of distributions in H0 and H1, rather than in terms of P¯0 and P¯1 which
average over a prior that perhaps does not reflect one’s beliefs fully. For the case that H1 and H2 share
a nuisance parameter g taking values in some set G, one can define this strong calibration hypothesis
as stating that, for all c with β(xτ ) = c for some xτ ∈ X τ , all g ∈ G,
c =
P (β(xτ ) = c | H1, g)
P (β(xτ ) = c | H0, g)
. (7)
where β is still defined as above; in particular, when calculating β one does not condition on the param-
eter having the value g, but when assessing its likelihood as in (7) one does. De Heide and Grünwald
(2018) show that the strong calibration hypothesis certainly does not hold for general parameters, but
they also show by simulations that it does hold in the practically important case with group invariance
and right Haar priors. In Section 4.4 we show that in such cases, one can indeed prove that a version
of (7) holds.
2.3 Third Sense of Handling Optional Stopping: (Semi-) Frequentist
In classical, Neyman-Pearson style null hypothesis testing, the main concern is limiting the false
positive rate of a hypothesis test. If this false positive rate is bounded above by some α > 0, then
a null hypothesis significance test (NHST) is said to have significance level α, and if the significance
level is independent of the stopping rule used, we say that the test is robust under frequentist optional
stopping.
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Definition 1. A function S :
⋃T
i=m X
i → {0, 1} is said to be a frequentist sequential test with signifi-
cance level α and minimal sample size m that is robust under optional stopping relative to H0 if for
all P ∈ H0
P (∃n ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , T} : S(Xn) = 1) ≤ α,
i.e. the probability that there is an n at which S(Xn) = 1 (‘the test rejects H0 when given sample X
n’)
is bounded by α.
In our present setting, we can take m = 0 (larger m become important in Section 3.3), so n runs from
1 to T and it is easy to show that, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we have
P¯0
(
∃n ∈ {1, . . . , T} :
1
β(xn)
≤ α
)
≤ α. (8)
Proof. For any fixed α and any sequence xT = x1, . . . , xT , let τ(x
T ) be the smallest n such that,
for the initial segment xn of xT , β(xn) ≥ 1/α (if no such n exists we set τ(xT ) = T ). Then τ is a
stopping time, Xτ is a random variable, and the probability in (8) is equal to the P¯0-probability that
β(Xτ ) ≥ 1/α) which by Markov’s inequality is bounded by α.
It follows that, if H0 is a singleton, then the sequential test S that rejects H0 (outputs S(X
n) = 1)
whenever β(xn) ≥ 1/α is a frequentist sequential test with significance level α that is robust under
optional stopping.
The fact that Bayes factor testing with singleton H0 handles optional stopping in this frequentist way
was noted by Edwards et al. (1963) and also emphasized by Good (1991), among many others. If H0
is not a singleton, then (8) still holds, so the Bayes factor still handles optional stopping in a mixed
frequentist (Type I-error) and Bayesian (marginalizing over prior within H0) sense. While form a
frequentist perspective, one may not consider this to be fully satisfactory, as argued by Bayarri et al.
(2016) this semi-frequentist sense of optional stopping, when applied to H1 rather than H0, sometimes
does correspond to what many frequentists consider acceptable in practice.
Yet, in the practically important group invariance case, we can once again show that, if all parameters
in H0 are right Haar, then the Bayes factor is truly robust to optional stopping in the above frequentist
sense, i.e. (8) will hold for all P ∈ H0 and not just ‘on average’. While this is hinted at in several papers
(e.g. (Bayarri et al., 2016, Dass and Berger, 2003)) it seems to never have been proven formally; we
provide a proof in Section 4.5.
3 The General Case
Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space. Fix somem ≥ 0 and consider a sequence of functionsXm+1, Xm+2, . . .
on Ω so that each Xn, n > m takes values in some fixed set (‘outcome space’) X with associated σ-
algebra Σ. When working with proper priors we invariably take m = 0 and then we define Xn :=
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and we let Σ
(n) be the n-fold product algebra of Σ. When working with improper
priors it turns out to be useful (more explanation further below) to take m > 0 and define an initial
sample random variable 〈X(m)〉 on Ω, taking values in some set 〈Xm〉 ⊆ Xm with associated σ-algebra
〈Σ(m)〉. In that case we set, for n ≥ m, 〈Xn〉 = {xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n : xm = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ 〈X
m〉},
and Xn := (〈X(m)〉, Xm+1, Xm+2, . . . , Xn) and we let Σ
(n) be 〈Σ(m)〉 ×
∏n
j=m+1Σ. In either case,
we let Fn be the σ-algebra (relative to Ω) generated by (X
n,Σ(n)). Then (Fn)n=m,m+1,... is a fil-
tration relative to F and if we equip (Ω,F) with a distribution P then 〈X(m)〉, Xm+1, Xm+2, . . .
becomes a random process adapted to F . A stopping time is now generalized to be a function
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τ : Ω → {m + 1,m + 2, . . .} ∪ {∞} such that for each n > m, the event {τ = n} is Fn-measurable;
note that we only consider stopping after m initial outcomes. Again, for a given stopping time τ and
sequence of data xn = (x1, . . . , xn), we say that x
n is compatible with τ if it satisfies Xn = xn ⇒ τ = n,
i.e. {ω ∈ Ω : Xn(ω) = xn} ⊂ {ω ∈ Ω : τ(ω) = n}.
H0 and H1 are now sets of probability distributions on (Ω,F). Again one writes Hj = {Pθ|j : θ ∈ Θj}
where now the parameter sets Θj (which, however, could itself be infinite-dimensional) are themselves
equipped with suitable σ-algebras Σ(Θj).
We will still represent both H0 and H1 by unique measures P¯0 and P¯1 respectively, which we now
allow to be based on (1) with improper priors pi0 and pi1 that may be infinite measures; as a result P¯0
and P¯1 are positive real measures that may themselves be infinite. We also allow X to be a general (in
particular uncountable) set. Both nonintegrability and uncountability cause complications, but these
can be overcome if suitable Radon-Nikodym derivatives exist. To ensure this, we will assume that for
all n ≥ max{m, 1}, for all k ∈ {0, 1} and θ ∈ Θk, P
(n)
θ|k , P¯
(n)
0 and P¯
(n)
1 are all mutually absolutely
continuous and that the measures P¯
(n)
1 and P¯
(n)
0 are σ-finite. Then there also exists a measure ρ on
(Ω,F) such that, for all such n, P¯
(n)
1 , P¯
(n)
0 and ρ
(n) are all mutually absolutely continuous: we can
simply take ρ(n) = P¯
(n)
0 , but in practice, it is often possible and convenient to take ρ such that ρ
(n) is
the Lebesgue measure on Rn, which is why explicitly introduce ρ here.
The absolute continuity conditions guarantee that all required Radon-Nikodym derivatives exist. Fi-
nally, we assume that the measures P¯
(n)
0 and P¯
(n)
1 are proper probability measures for all n > m. This
final requirement is the reason why we sometimes need to consider m > 0 and nonstandard sample
spaces 〈Xn〉 in the first place: in practice , one usually starts with the standard setting of a (Ω,F)
where m = 0 and all Xi have the same status. In all practical situations with improper priors pi0
and/or pi1 that we know of, there is a smallest finite j and a set X
◦ ⊂ X j that has measure 0 under all
probability distributions in H0 ∪H1, such that, restricted to the sample space X
j \ X ◦, the measures
P¯
(j)
1 and P¯
(j)
0 are σ-finite and mutually absolutely continuous, and the posteriors pik(Θk | x
j) (as
defined in the standard manner in (11) below) are proper probability measures. One then sets m to
equal this j, and sets 〈Xm〉 := Xm \ X ◦, and the required properness will be guaranteed. Our initial
sample 〈X(m)〉 is a variation of what is called (for example, by Bayarri et al. (2012)) a minimal sample.
Yet, the sample size of a standard minimal sample is itself a random quantity; by restricting Xm to
〈Xm〉, we can take its sample size m to be constant rather than random, which will greatly simplify
the treatment of optional stopping with group invariance; see Example 1 and 2 below.
We henceforth refer to the setting now defined (with m and initial space 〈Xm〉 satisfying the require-
ments above) as the general case.
We need an analogue of (5) for this general case. If P¯0 and P¯1 are probability measures, then there
is still a standard definition of conditional probability distributions P (H | A) in terms of conditional
expectation for any given σ-algebra A; based on this, we can derive the required analogue in two steps.
First, we consider the case that τ ≡ n for some n > m; we know in advance that we observe Xn for a
fixed n: the appropriate A is then Fn, pi(H | A)(ω) is determined by X
n(ω) hence can be written as
pi(H | Xn), and a straightforward calculation gives that
pi(H1 | X
n = xn)
pi(H0 | Xn = xn)
=
((
dP¯
(n)
1 )/dρ
(n)
dP¯
(n)
0 /dρ
(n)
)
(xn)
)
·
pi(H1)
pi(H0)
(9)
where (dP¯
(n)
1 /dρ
(n)) and (dP¯
(n)
0 /dρ
(n)) are versions of the Radon-Nikodym derivatives defined relative
to ρ(n). The second step is now to follow exactly the same steps as in the derivation of (5), replacing
β(Xn) by (9) wherever appropriate (we omit the details). This yields, for any n such that ρ(τ = n) > 0,
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and for ρ(n)-almost every xn that is compatible with τ ,
γn︷ ︸︸ ︷
pi(H1 | x
n)
pi(H0 | xn)
=
pi(H1 | X
n = xn, τ = n)
pi(H0 | Xn = xn, τ = n)
=
βn︷ ︸︸ ︷((
dP¯
(n)
1 /dρ
(n)
dP¯
(n)
0 /dρ
(n)
)
(xn)
)
·
pi(H1)
pi(H0)
, (10)
where here as below, for n ≥ m, we abbreviate pi(Hk | X
n = xn) to pi(Hk | x
n).
The above expression for the posterior is valid if P¯0 and P¯1 are probability measures; we will simply
take it as the definition of the Bayes factor for the general case. Again this coincides with standard
usage for the improper prior case. In particular, let us define the conditional posteriors and Bayes
factors given 〈X(m)〉 = xm in the standard manner, by the formal application of Bayes’ rule, for
k = 0, 1 and measurable Θ′k ⊂ Θk and F -measurable A,
pik(Θ
′
k | x
m) :=
∫
Θ′
k
dP
(m)
θ|k
dρ(m)
(xm)dpik(θ)∫
Θk
dP
(m)
θ|k
dρ(m)
(xm)dpik(θ)
(11)
P¯k(A | x
m) := P¯k(A | 〈X
(m)〉 = xm) :=
∫
Θk
Pθ|k(A | 〈X
(m)〉 = xm)dpik(θ | x
m), (12)
where Pθ|k(A | 〈X
(m)〉 = xm) is defined as the value that (a version of) the conditional probability
Pθ|k(A | Fm) takes when 〈X
(m)〉 = xm, and is thus defined up to a set of ρ(m)-measure 0.
With these definitions, it is straightforward to derive we have the following coherence property, which
automatically holds if the priors are proper, and which in combination with (10) expresses that first
updating on xm and then on xm+1, . . . , xn has the same result as updating based on the full x1, . . . , xn
at once:
pi(H1 | X
n = xn, τ = n)
pi(H0 | Xn = xn, τ = n)
=
(
dP¯
(n)
1 (· | x
m)
dP¯
(n)
0 (· | x
m)
(xn)
)
·
pi(H1 | x
m)
pi(H0 | xm)
. (13)
3.1 τ-independence, general case
The general version of the claim that the posterior odds do not depend on the specific stopping rule
that was used is now immediate, since the expression (10) for the Bayes factor does not depend on the
stopping time τ .
3.2 Calibration, general case
We will now show that the calibration hypothesis continues to hold in our general setting. From here
onward, we make the further reasonable assumption that for every xm ∈ 〈Xm〉, P¯0(τ = ∞ | x
m) =
P¯1(τ =∞ | x
m) = 0 (the stopping time is almost surely finite), and we define Tτ := {n ∈ N>0 : P¯0(τ =
n) > 0}.
To prepare further, let {Bj : j ∈ Tτ} be any collection of positive random variables such that for each
j ∈ Tτ , Bj is F j-measurable. We can define the stopped random variable Bτ as
Bτ :=
∞∑
j=0
1{τ=j}Bj , (14)
where we note that, under this definition, Bτ is well-defined even if EP¯0 [τ ] =∞.
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We can define the induced measures on the positive real line under the null and alternative hypothesis
for any probability measure P on (Ω,F):
P [Bτ ] : B(R>0)→ [0, 1] : A 7→ P
(
B−1τ (A)
)
. (15)
where B(R>0) denotes the Borel σ-algebra of R>0. Note that, when we refer to P
[Bn], this is identical
to P [Bτ ] for the stopping time τ which on all of Ω stops at n. The following lemma is crucial for
passing from fixed-sample size to stopping-rule based results.
Lemma 1. Let Tτ and {Bn : n ∈ Tτ} be as above. Consider two probability measures P0 and P1 on
(Ω,F). Suppose that for all n ∈ Tτ , the following fixed-sample size calibration property holds:
for some fixed c > 0, P0
[Bn] − almost all b :
P1(τ = n)
P0(τ = n)
·
dP1
[Bn](· | τ = n)
dP0
[Bn](· | τ = n)
(b) = c · b. (16)
Then we have
for P0
[Bτ ]-almost all b :
dP1
[Bτ ]
dP0
[Bτ ]
(b) = c · b. (17)
The proof is in Appendix A.
In this subsection we apply this lemma to the measures P¯k(· | x
m) for arbitrary fixed xm ∈ 〈Xm〉,
with their induced measures P¯
[γτ ]
0 (· | x
m), P¯
[γτ ]
1 (· | x
m) for the stopped posterior odds γτ . Formally, the
posterior odds γn as defined in (10) constitute a random variable for each n, and, under our mutual
absolute continuity assumption for P¯0 and P¯1, γn can be directly written as
dP¯
(n)
1
dP¯
(n)
0
· pi(H1)/pi(H0).
Since, by definition, the measures P¯k(· | x
m) are probability measures, the Radon-Nikodym derivatives
in (16) and (17) are well-defined.
Lemma 2. We have for all xm ∈ 〈Xm〉, all n > m:
for P¯
[γn]
0 (· | x
m)- almost all b :
P¯
[γn]
1 (τ = n | x
m)
P¯
[γn]
0 (τ = n | x
m)
·
dP¯
[γn]
1 (· | x
m)
dP¯
[γn]
0 (· | x
m)
(b) =
pi(H0 | x
m)
pi(H1 | xm)
· b. (18)
Combining the two lemmas now immediately gives (19) below, and combining further with (13) and
(10) gives (20):
Corollary 3. In the setting considered above, we have for all xm ∈ 〈Xm〉:
for P¯
[γτ ]
0 (· | x
m)-almost all b :
pi(H1 | x
m)
pi(H0 | xm)
·
dP¯
[γτ ]
1 (· | x
m)
dP¯
[γτ ]
0 (· | x
m)
(b) = b, (19)
and also
for P¯
[γτ ]
0 (· | x
m)-almost all b :
pi(H1)
pi(H0)
·
dP¯
[γτ ]
1
dP¯
[γτ ]
0
(b) = b, (20)
In words, the posterior odds remain calibrated under any stopping rule τ which stops almost surely at
times m < τ <∞.
For discrete and strictly positive measures with prior odds pi(H1)/pi(H0) = 1, we always have m = 0,
and (19) is equivalent to (6). Note that P¯
[γτ ]
0 x
m-a.s. in (19) is equivalent to P¯
[γτ ]
1 x
m-a.s. because the
two measures are assumed mutually absolutely continuous.
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3.3 (Semi-) Frequentist Optional Stopping
In this section we consider our general setting as in the beginning of Section 3.2, i.e. with the added
assumption that the stopping time is a.s. finite, and with Tτ := {j ∈ N>0 : P¯0(τ = j) > 0}. From here
onward we shall further simplify slightly by assuming that the prior on H0 and H1 is equal, so that
the posterior odds (given xn and possibly τ = n) equal the Bayes factor βn.
Consider any initial sample xm ∈ 〈Xm〉 and let P¯0 | x
m and P¯1 | x
m be the conditional Bayes marginal
distributions as defined in (12). We first note that, by Markov’s inequality, for any nonnegative
random variable Z on Ω with, for all xm ∈ 〈Xm〉, EP¯0|xm [Z] ≤ 1, we must have, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
P¯0(Z
−1 ≤ α | xm) ≤ EP¯0|xm [βτ ]/α
−1 ≤ α.
Proposition 4. Let τ be any stopping rule satisfying our requirements. The stopped Bayes factor βτ
as defined by (14) (with βj in the role of Bj) is a random variable that satisfies, for all x
m ∈ 〈Xm〉,
EP¯0|xm [βτ ] ≤ 1, so that, by the reasoning above, P¯0(
1
βτ
≤ α | xm) ≤ α.
Proof. The following implications are all immediate:
EP¯0|xm [βτ ] = EP¯0|xm

 ∑
n:P¯0(τ=n|xm)>0
1{τ=n}βn


=
∑
n:P¯0(τ=n|xm)>0
1{τ=n}P¯0(τ = n | x
m) · EP¯0|xm,τ=n [βn]
=
∑
n:P¯0(τ=n|xm)>0
1{τ=n}P¯0(τ = n | x
m) ·
∫
dP¯
(n)
1 (· | x
m, τ = n)
dP¯
(n)
0 (X
n | xm, τ = n)
d(P¯0 | x
m, τ) = 1.
The desired result now follows by plugging in a particular stopping rule: let S :
⋃∞
i=m X
i → {0, 1} be
the frequentist sequential test defined by setting, for all n > m, xn ∈ 〈Xn〉: S(xn) = 1 iff βn ≥ 1/α.
Corollary 5. Let t∗ ∈ {m+1,m+2, . . .}∪ {∞} be the smallest t∗ > m for which β−1t ≤ α. Then for
arbitrarily large T , when applied to the stopping rule τ := min{T, t∗}, we find that
P¯0(∃n ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , T} : S(X
n) = 1 | xm) = P¯0(∃n ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , T} : β
−1
n ≤ α | x
m) ≤ α.
The corollary implies that the test S is robust under optional stopping in the frequentist sense relative
to H0 (Definition 1). Note that, just as in the simple case, the setting is really just ‘semi-frequentist’
whenever H0 is not a singleton.
4 Optional stopping with group invariance
Whenever the null hypothesis is composite, the previous results only hold under the marginal distri-
bution P¯0 or, in the case of improper priors, under P¯0(· | X
m = xm). When a group structure can be
imposed on the outcome space and (a subset of the) parameters that is joint to H0 and H1, stronger
results can be derived for calibration and frequentist optional stopping. Invariably, such parameters
function as nuisance parameters and our results are obtained if we equip them with the so-called right
Haar prior which is usually improper. Below we show how we then obtain results that simultaneously
hold for all values of the nuisance parameters. Such cases include many standard testing scenarios such
as the (Bayesian variations) of the t-test, as illustrated in the examples below. Note though that our
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results do not apply to settings with improper priors for which no group structure exists; for example,
if Pθ|0 expresses that X1, X2, . . . are i.i.d. Poisson(θ), then from an objective Bayes or MDL point of
view it makes sense to adopt Jeffreys’ prior for the Poisson model; this prior is improper, allows initial
sample size m = 1, but does not allow for a group structure. For such a prior we can only use the
marginal results Corollary 3 and Corollary 5.
4.1 Background for fixed sample sizes
Here we prepare for our results by providing some general background on invariant priors for Bayes
factors with fixed sample size n on models with nuisance parameters that admit a group structure,
introducing the right Haar measure, the corresponding Bayes marginals, and (maximal) invariants.
We use these results in Section 4.2 to derive Lemma 7, which gives us a strong version of calibration
for fixed n. The setting is extended to variable stopping times in Section 4.3, and then Lemma 7 is
used in this extended setting to obtain our strong optional stopping results in Section 4.4 and 4.5.
For now, we assume a sample space 〈Xn〉 that is locally compact and Haussdorf, and that is a subset
of some product space Xn where X is itself locally compact and Haussdorf. This requirement is met,
for example, when X = R and 〈Xn〉 = Xn. In practice, the space 〈Xn〉 is invariably a subset of
Xn that excludes some ‘singular’ outcomes that have measure 0 under all hypotheses involved. We
associate 〈Xn〉 with its Borel σ-algebra which we denote as Fn. Observations are denoted by the
random vector Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ 〈X
n〉. We thus consider outcomes of fixed sample size, denoting
these as xn ∈ 〈Xn〉, returning to the case with stopping times in Section 4.4 and 4.5.
We start with some group-theoretical preliminaries; for more details, see e.g. (Eaton, 1989, Wijsman,
1990, Andersson, 1982).
Definition 2 (Eaton (1989), Definition 2.1). Let G be a group of measurable one-to-one transforma-
tions on X with identity e. Let Y be a set. A function F : Y ×G→ Y satisfying
1. F (y, e) = y, y ∈ Y
2. F (y, g1g2) = F (F (y, g1), g2), g1, g2 ∈ G, y ∈ Y
specifies G acting on the right of Y .
In practice, F is omitted: we will write y · g for a group element g acting on the right of y ∈ Y . For a
subset A ⊆ Y , we write A · g := {a · g | a ∈ A}. From now on we let G be a locally compact group G
that acts topologically and properly1 on the right of 〈Xn〉.
Let P0,e and P1,e (notation to become clear below) be two arbitrary probability distributions on 〈X
n〉
that are mutually absolutely continuous. We will now generate hypothesis classes H0 and H1, both
sets of distributions on 〈Xn〉 with parameter space G, starting from P0,e and P1,e. The group action
of G on 〈Xn〉 induces a group action on these measures defined by
Pk,g(A) := (Pk,e · g)(A) := Pk,e(A · g
−1) =
∫
1{A}(x · g)Pk,e(dx) (21)
for any set A ∈ Fn, k = 0, 1. When applied to A = 〈X
n〉, we get Pk,g(A) = 1, for all g ∈ G, whence
we have created two sets of probability measures parameterized by g, i.e.,
H0 := {P0,g | g ∈ G} ; H1 := {P1,g | g ∈ G}. (22)
1A group acts properly on a set Y if the mapping ψ : Y ×G 7→ Y ×Y defined by ψ(y, g) = (y ·g, y) is a proper mapping,
i.e. the inverse image of ψ of each compact set in Y × Y is a compact set in Y ×G. (Eaton (1989), Definition 5.1)
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In this context, g ∈ G, can typically be viewed as nuisance parameter, i.e. a parameter that is not
directly of interest, but needs to be accounted for in the analysis. This is illustrated in Example 1
and Example 2 below. The examples also illustrate how to extend this setting to cases where there
are more parameters than just g ∈ G in either H0 or H1. We extend the whole setup to our general
setting with non-fixed n in Section 4.4.
We use the right Haar measure for G as a prior to define the Bayes marginals:
Definition 3 (Conway (2013), Example 1.11). Let G be a locally compact topological group. Then the
right invariant Haar measure (in short: right Haar measure) for G is a Borel measure ν satisfying
1. ν(A) > 0 for every nonempty open set A ⊆ G,
2. ν(K) <∞ for every compact set K ⊆ G,
3. ν(A · g) = ν(A) for every g ∈ G and every measurable A ⊆ G.
The Bayes marginals are then defined to be:
P¯k(A) =
∫
G
∫
〈Xn〉
1{A} dPk,g ν(dg) (23)
for k = 0, 1 and A ∈ Fn. Typically, the right Haar measure is improper so that the Bayes marginals
P¯k are not integrable. Yet, in all cases of interest, they are (a) still σ-finite, and, (b), P¯0, P¯1 and all
distributions in Hk, k = 0, 1, g ∈ G are mutually absolutely continuous; we will henceforth assume
that (a) and (b) are the case.
Example 1. Consider the one-sample t-test as described by Rouder et al. (2009), going back to
(Jeffreys, 1961). The test considers normally distributed data with unknown standard deviation. The
test is meant to answer the question whether the data has mean µ = 0 (the null hypothesis) or
some other mean (the alternative hypothesis). Below, all densities are taken with respect to Lebesgue
measure. Following (Rouder et al., 2009), a Cauchy prior density, denoted by piδ(δ), is placed on the
effect size δ = µ/σ. The unknown standard deviation is a nuisance parameter and is equipped with the
right Haar prior with density piσ(σ) =
1
σ under both hypotheses. Abbreviating, for general measure P
on 〈Xn〉, (dP/ dλ) (the density of distribution P relative to Lebesgue measure on Rn) to p, this gives
the following marginal densities on n outcomes:
p0,σ(x
n) =
1
(2piσ2)n/2
· exp
(
1
2piσ2
n∑
i=1
x2i
)
p1,σ,δ(x
n) =
1
(2piσ2)n/2
· exp
(
−
n
2
[(
x
σ
− δ
)2
+
( 1
n
∑n
i=1(xi − x)
2
σ2
)])
(with x =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi)
p1,σ(x
n) =
∫
p1,σ,δ(x
n)piδ(δ)dδ
p¯0(x
n) =
∫ ∞
0
p0,σ(x
n)piσ(σ)dσ,
p¯1(x
n) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
p1,σ,δ(x
n)piδ(δ)piσ(σ)dδ dσ =
∫ ∞
0
p1,σ(x
n)piσ(σ)dσ.
Normally, this is viewed as a test between H0 = {P0,σ : σ ∈ R>0} and H
′
1 = {P1,σ,δ : σ ∈ R>0, δ ∈ R},
but we can obviously also view it as test between H0 and H1 = {P1,σ}, i.e. we integrate out the
parameter δ. Then H0 and H1 will be in the form (22) needed to state our results. In all standard
invariant settings, one can reduce H0 and H1 to this form in the same way, by integrating out all other
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parameters, which is possible as long we equip those parameters with proper priors, which is invariably
done in practice.
The group for the nuisance parameter σ is the group of scale transformations G = {c : c ∈ R>0}. We
thus let the sample space be 〈Xn〉 = Rn \ {0}n: we remove the measure-zero set {0}n, such that
the group action is proper on the sample space. The group action is defined by xn · c = c xn for
xn ∈ 〈Xn〉, c ∈ G. Take a g ∈ G. The measures Pk,g defined by (21) are given by their densities p0,σ
and p1,σ as defined above, with σ replaced by g.
We now turn to the main ingredient that will be needed to obtain results on optional stopping: the
quotient σ-algebra.
Definition 4 (Eaton (1989), Chapter 2). A group G acting on the right of a set Y induces an
equivalence relation: y1 ∼ y2 if and only if there exists g ∈ G such that y1 = y2 · g. This equivalence
relation partitions the space in orbits: Oy = {y · g | g ∈ G}, the collection of which is called the
quotient space Y/G. There exists a map, the natural projection, from Y to the quotient space which
is defined by ϕY : Y → Y/G : y 7→ {y · g | g ∈ G}, and which we use to define the quotient σ-algebra
Gn = {ϕ
−1
〈Xn〉(ϕ〈Xn〉(A)) | A ∈ Fn}. (24)
Definition 5 (Eaton (1989), Chapter 2). A random element Un on 〈X
n〉 is invariant if for all g ∈ G,
xn ∈ 〈Xn〉, Un(x
n) = Un(x
n · g). The random element Un is maximal invariant if Un is invariant and
for all yn ∈ 〈Xn〉, Un(x
n) = Un(y
n) implies xn = yn · g for some g ∈ G.
Thus, Un is maximal invariant if and only if Un is constant on each orbit, and takes different values
on different orbits; ϕ〈Xn〉 is thus an example of a maximal invariant. Note that any maximal invariant
is Gn-measurable. The importance of this quotient σ-algebra Gn is the following evident fact:
Proposition 6. For fixed k ∈ {0, 1}, every invariant Un has the same distribution under all Pk,g, g ∈
G.
Chapter 2 of (Eaton, 1989) provides several methods and examples how to construct a concrete maximal
invariant, including the first two given below. Since βn is invariant under the group action of G (see
below), βn is an example of an invariant, although not necessarily of a maximal invariant.
Example 1 (continued) Consider the setting of the one-sample t-test as described above in Exam-
ple 1. A maximal invariant for xn ∈ 〈Xn〉 is Un(x
n) = (x1/|x1|, x2/|x1|, . . . , xn/|x1|).
Example 2. A second example, with a group invariance structure on two parameters, is the setting of
the two-sample t-test with the right Haar prior (which coincides here with Jeffreys’ prior) pi(µ, σ) = 1/σ
(see Rouder et al. (2009) for details): the group is G = {(a, b) : a > 0, b ∈ R}. Let the sample space be
〈Xn〉 = Rn \ span(en), where en denotes a vector of ones of length n (this is to exclude the measure-zero
line for which the s(xn) is zero), and define the group action by xn · (a, b) = axn + ben for x
n ∈ 〈Xn〉.
Then (Eaton (1989), Example 2.15) a maximal invariant for xn ∈ 〈Xn〉 is Un(x
n) = (xn− xen)/s(x
n),
where x is the sample mean and s(xn) =
(∑n
i=1(xi − x)
2
)1/2
.
However, we can also construct a maximal invariant similar to the one in Example 1, which gives a
special status to an initial sample:
Un (X
n) =
(
X2 −X1
|X2 −X1|
,
X3 −X1
|X2 −X1|
, . . . ,
Xn −X1
|X2 −X1|
)
, n ≥ 2.
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4.2 Relatively Invariant Measures and Calibration for Fixed n
Let Un be a maximal invariant, taking values in measurable space (Un,Gn). Although we have given
more concrete examples above, it follows from the results of Andersson (1982) that, in case we do
not know how to construct a Un, we can always take Un = ϕ〈Xn〉. Since we assume mutual absolute
continuity, the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dP
[Un]
1,g
dP
[Un]
0,g
must exist and we can apply the following theorem
(note it is here that the use of right Haar measure is crucial; a different result holds for the left Haar
measure):2
Theorem (Berger et al., 1998, Theorem 2.1) Under our previous definitions of and assumptions
on G, Pk,g, P¯k let β(x
n) := P¯1(x
n)/P¯0(x
n) be the Bayes factor based on xn. Let Un be a maximal
invariant as above, with (adopting the notation of (15)) marginal measures P
[Un]
k,g , for k = 0, 1 and
g ∈ G. There exists a version of the Radon-Nikodym derivative such that we have for all g ∈ G, all
xn ∈ 〈Xn〉,
dP
[Un]
1,g
dP
[Un]
0,g
(Un(x
n)) = β(xn). (25)
As a first consequence of the theorem above, we note (as did Berger et al. (1998)) that the Bayes factor
βn := β(X
N) is Gn-measurable (it is constant on orbits) , and thus it has the same distribution under
P0,g and P1,g for all g ∈ G. The theorem also implies the following crucial lemma:
Lemma 7. [Strong Calibration for Fixed n] Under the assumptions of the theorem above, let Un
be a maximal invariant and let Vn be a Gn-measurable binary random variable with P0,g(Vn = 1) >
0, P1,g(Vn = 1) > 0. Adopting the notation of (15), we can choose the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dP
[βn]
1,g (· | Vn = 1)/ dP
[βn]
0,g (· | Vn = 1) so that we have, for all x
n ∈ 〈Xn〉:
P1,g(Vn = 1)
P0,g(Vn = 1)
·
dP
[βn]
1,g (· | Vn = 1)
dP
[βn]
0,g (· | Vn = 1)
(βn(x
n)) = βn(x
n), (26)
where for the special case with Pk,g(Vn = 1) = 1, we get
dP
[βn]
1,g
dP
[βn]
0,g
(βn(x
n)) = βn(x
n).
4.3 Extending to Our General Setting with Non-Fixed Sample Sizes
We start with the same setting as above: a group G on sample space 〈Xn〉 ⊂ Xn that acts topologically
and properly on the right of 〈Xn〉; two distributions P0,e and P1,e on (〈X
n〉,Fn) that are used to
generate H0 and H1, and Bayes marginal measures based on the right Haar measure P¯0 and P¯1, which
are both σ-finite. We now denote Hk as H
(n)
k , Pk,e as P
(n)
k,e and P¯k as P¯
(n)
k , all P ∈ H
(n)
0 ∪H
(n)
1 are
mutually absolutely continuous.
We now extend this setting to our general random process setting as specified in the beginning of
Section 3.2 by further assuming that, for the same group G, for some m > 0, the above setting is
defined for each n ≥ m. To connect the H
(n)
k for all these n, we further assume that there exists a
subset 〈Xm〉 ⊂ Xm that has measure 1 under P
(n)
k,e (and hence under all P
(n)
g,e ) such that for all n ≥ m:
2This theorem requires that there exists some relatively invariant measure µ on 〈Xn〉 such that for k = 0, 1, g ∈ G,
the Pk,g all have a density relative to µ. Since the Bayes marginal P¯0 based on the right Haar prior is easily seen to be
such a relatively invariant measure, the conditions for the theorem apply.
14
1. We can write 〈Xn〉 = {xn ∈ Xn : (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ 〈X
m〉}.
2. For all xn ∈ 〈Xn〉, the posterior ν | xn based on the right Haar measure ν is proper.
3. The probability measures P
(n)
k,e and P
(n+1)
k,e satisfy Kolmogorov’s compatibility condition for a
random process.
4. The group action · on the measures P
(n)
k,e and P
(n+1)
k,e is compatible, i.e. for every n > 0, for every
A ∈ Fn, every g ∈ G, k ∈ {0, 1}, we have P
(n+1)
k,g (A) = P
(n)
k,g (A).
Requirement 4. simply imposes the condition that the group action considered is the same for all
n ∈ N. As a consequence of 3. and 4., the probability measures P
(n)
k,g and P
(n+1)
k,g satisfy Kolmogorov’s
compatibility condition for all g ∈ G, k ∈ {0, 1} which means that there exists a probability measure
Pk,g on (Ω,F) (under which 〈X
(m)〉, Xm+1, Xm+2, . . . is a random process), defined as in the beginning
of Section 3, whose marginals for n ≥ m coincide with P
(n)
k,g , and there exist measures P¯0 and P¯1 on
(Ω,F) whose marginals for n ≥ m coincide with P¯
(n)
0 and P¯
(n)
1 . We have thus defined a set H0
and H1 of hypotheses on (Ω,F) and the corresponding Bayes marginals P¯0 and P¯1 and are back in
our general setting. It is easily verified that the 1- and 2-sample Bayesian t-tests both satisfy all
these assumptions: in Example 1, take m = 1 and 〈Xm〉 = R \ {0}; in Example 4.1, take m = 2
and 〈Xm〉 = R2 \ {(a, a) : a ∈ R}. The conditions can also be verified for the variety of examples
considered by Berger et al. (1998) and Bayarri et al. (2012). In fact, our initial sample xm ∈ 〈Xm〉 is
a variation of what they call a minimal sample; by excluding ‘singular’ outcomes from Xm to ensure
that the group acts properly on 〈Xm〉, we can guarantee that the initial sample is of fixed size; the
size of the minimal sample can be larger, on a set of measure 0 under all P ∈ H0 ∪ H1, e.g. if, in
Example 4.1, X1 = X2. We chose to ensure a fixed size m since it makes the extension to random
processes considerably easier.
Just as in the case with a fixed n, if we start with large (or even nonparametric) hypotheses H ′k =
{Pθ′|k : θ
′ ∈ Θ′k} which we want to equip with a nuisance parameter g, we can still view this as an
instance of the present setting by first taking a proper prior density dpi(θ′) on θ′, setting Pk,e equal to
the corresponding Bayes marginal, i.e.
Pk,e :=
∫
Pθ′pi(θ
′)dpi(θ′), (27)
and defining P
(n)
k,g for each n (and hence Pk,g) via (21). We can then view Hk equivalently as {Pk,g :
g ∈ G}, with P¯k the Bayes marginal based on the right Haar prior (and Θk in (1) is equal to G); or as
Hk = {P(θ′,g)|k : θ
′ ∈ Θ′k, g ∈ G}, (with Θk = (Θ
′
k, G)) (28)
with now P¯k the Bayes marginal based on the product prior of pi(θ
′) and the right Haar prior. This
was illustrated (with θ′ equal to the effect size) for the 1-sample Bayesian t-test in Example 1.
4.4 Strong Calibration
Consider the setting, definitions and assumptions of the previous subsection, with the additional
assumptions and definitions made in the beginning of Section 3.3, in particular the assumption of a.s.
finite stopping time and equal prior odds. We will now show a strong calibration theorem for the Bayes
factors βn = (dP¯
(n)
0 )/(dP¯
(n)
1 )(X
n) defined in terms of the Bayes marginals P¯0 and P¯1 with the right
Haar prior. Thus βτ is defined as in (14) with β in the role of B.
15
Theorem 8 (Strong calibration under optional stopping). Let τ be a stopping time satisfying our
requirements, such that additionally, for each n > m, the event {τ = n} is Gn-measurable. Then,
adopting the notation of (15), for all g ∈ G, for P
[βτ ]
0,g -almost every b > 0, we have:
dP
[βτ ]
1,g
dP
[βτ ]
0,g
(b) = b.
That means that the posterior odds remain calibrated under every stopping rule τ adapted to the quotient
space filtration Gm,Gm+1, . . ., under all P0,g.
Proof. Fix some g ∈ G. We simply first apply Lemma 7 with Vn = 1{τ=n}, which gives that the
premise (16) of Lemma 1 holds with c = 1 and βn in the role of Bn (it is here that we need that τn
is Gn-measurable, otherwise we could not apply Lemma 7 with the required definition of Vn). We can
now use Lemma 1 with P0,g in the role of P0 to reach the desired conclusion for the chosen g. Since
this works for all g ∈ G, the result follows.
Example 1, Continued: Admissible and Inadmissible Stopping Rules We obtain strong
calibration for the one-sample t-test with respect to the nuisance parameter σ (see Example 1 above)
when the stopping rule is adapted to the quotient filtration Gm,Gm+1, . . .. Under each Pk,g ∈ Hk, the
Bayes factors βm, βm+1, . . . define a random process on Ω such that each βn is Gn-measurable. This
means that a stopping time defined in terms of rule such as ‘stop at the smallest t at which βt > 20
or t = 106’ is allowed in the result above. If the stopping rule is a function of a sequence of maximal
invariants, like x1/|x1, x2/|x1|, . . ., it is adapted to the Gn as well and we can again apply the result
above. On the other hand, this requirement is violated, for example, by a stopping rule that stops
when
∑j
i=1(xi)
2 exceeds some fixed value, since such a stopping rule explicitly depends on the scale
of the sampled data.
4.5 Frequentist optional stopping
The special case of the following result for the one-sample Bayesian t-test was proven in the master’s
thesis (Hendriksen, 2017). Here we extend the result to general group invariances.
Theorem 9 (Frequentist optional stopping for composite null hypotheses with group invariance).
Under the same conditions as in Section 4.4, let τ be a stopping time such that, for each n > m, the
event {τ = n} is Gn-measurable. Then, adopting the notation of (15), for all g ∈ G, the stopped Bayes
factor satisfies EP0,g [βτ ] =
∫
R>0
c dP
[βτ ]
0,g (c) = 1, so that, by the reasoning above Proposition 4, we have
for all g ∈ G: P0,g(
1
βτ
≤ α) ≤ α.
Proof. [of Theorem 9] We have
∫
R>0
c dP
[βτ ]
0,g (c) =
∫
R>0
dP
[βτ ]
1,g
dP
[βτ ]
0,g
(c)dP
[βτ ]
0,g (c) =
∫
R>0
dP
[βτ ]
1,g (c) = 1.
where the first equality follows directly from Theorem 8 and the final equality follows because P1,g is
a probability measure, integrating to 1.
Analogously to Corollary 5, the desired result now follows by plugging in a particular stopping rule: let
S :
⋃∞
i=m X
i → {0, 1} be the frequentist sequential test defined by setting, for all n > m, xn ∈ 〈Xn〉:
S(xn) = 1 iff βn ≥ 1/α.
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Corollary 10. Let t∗ ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . .} ∪ {∞} be the smallest t∗ > m for which β−1t∗ ≤ α. Then
for arbitrarily large T , when applied to the stopping rule τ := min{T, t∗}, we find that for all g ∈ G:
P0,g(∃n ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , T} : S(X
n) = 1 | xm) = P0,g(∃n ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , T} : β
−1
n ≤ α | x
m) ≤ α.
The corollary implies that the test S is robust under optional stopping in the frequentist sense relative
to H0 (Definition 1).
Example 1 (continued) When we choose a stopping rule that is (Gm,Gm+1, . . .)-measurable, the
hypothesis test is robust under (semi-) frequentist optional stopping. This holds for example, for the
one- and two-sample t-test (Rouder et al., 2009), Bayesian ANOVA (Rouder et al., 2012), and Bayesian
linear regression (Liang et al., 2008); again, for stopping rules that are not (Gm,Gm+1, . . .)-measurable,
robustness under frequentist optional stopping can be violated.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have identified three types of ‘handling optional stopping’: τ -independence, calibration and semi-
frequentist. We extended the corresponding definitions and results to general sample spaces with
potentially improper priors. For the special case of models H0 and H1 sharing a nuisance parame-
ter with a group invariant structure, we showed stronger versions of calibration and semi-frequentist
robustness to optional stopping. As a final remark, it is worth noting that — as is immediate from
the proofs — all our group-invariance results continue to hold in the setting with Hk as in (28), and
the definition of the Bayes marginal Pk,e relative to θ
′ as in (27) replaced by a probability measure
on (Ω,F) that is not necessarily of the Bayes marginal form. The results work for any probability
measure; in particularly one can take the alternatives for the Bayes marginal with proper prior that are
considered in the the minimum description length and sequential prediction literature (Barron et al.,
1998, Grünwald, 2007) under the name of universal distribution relative to {Pθ′ : θ
′ ∈ Θ′}; exam-
ples include the prequential, normalized maximum likelihood or ‘switch’ distributions considered by
van der Pas and Grünwald (2018).
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A Proofs Omitted from Main Text
Proof. [of Lemma 1] Let A ⊂ R>0 be any Borel measurable set. In the equations below, the sum and
integral can be swapped due to the monotone convergence theorem and the fact that Bτ is a positive
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function. ∫
A
dP1
[Bτ ] =
∫
Ω
1{Bτ∈A} dP1
[Bτ ]
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
〈Xn〉
1{Bτ∈A}1{τ=n} dP
(n)
1
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
〈Xn〉
1{Bn∈A}1{τ=n} dP
(n)
1 (· | τ = n) · P
(n)
1 (τ = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
〈Xn〉
1{Bn∈A} dP
(n)
1 (· | τ = n) · P
(n)
1 (τ = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
r>0
1{r∈A} dP1
[Bn](· | τ = n) · P
(n)
1 (τ = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
r>0
1{r∈A}
dP1
[Bn](· | τ = n)
dP0
[Bn](· | τ = n)
(r) dP0
[Bn](· | τ = n) · P
(n)
1 (τ = n)
(∗)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
r>0
1{r∈A}
P
(n)
0 (τ = n)
P
(n)
1 (τ = n)
· r dP0
[Bn](· | τ = n) · P
(n)
1 (τ = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
r>0
1{r∈A}r dP0
[Bn](· | τ = n) · P
(n)
0 (τ = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
〈Xn〉
1{Bn∈A} · Bn dP
(n)
0 (· | τ = n)P
(n)
0 (τ = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
〈Xn〉
1{Bn∈A}1{τ=n} ·Bn dP
(n)
0 (· | τ = n)P
(n)
0 (τ = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
〈Xn〉
1{Bτ∈A}1{τ=n} ·Bn dP
(n)
0
=
∫
Ω
1{Bτ∈A}
(
∞∑
n=0
1{τ=n}Bn
)
dP0 =
∫
A
tP0
[Bτ ](dt),
where (∗) follows because of our fixed n-calibration assumption.
We have shown that the function g defined by g(t) = t is the Radon-Nikodym derivative dP1
[Bτ ]
dP0[Bτ ]
.
Proof. [of Lemma 2] Let A be any Borel subset of R>0. We have:∫
A
dP¯
[γn]
1 (· | x
m, τ = n) =
∫
〈Xn〉
1{γn∈A} dP¯
(1)
n (· | x
m, τ = n)
=
∫
〈Xn〉
1{γn∈A}
(
dP¯
(1)
n (· | xm, τ = n)
dP¯
(0)
n (· | xm, τ = n)
)
dP¯ (0)n (· | x
m, τ = n)
(∗)
=
∫
〈Xn〉
1{γn∈A}γn ·
(
pi(H0 | x
m, τ = n)
pi(H1 | xm, τ = n)
)
dP¯ (0)n (· | x
m, τ = n)
=
∫
〈Xn〉
1{γn∈A}γn
(
P¯0(τ = n | x
m)pi(H0)
P¯1(τ = n | xm)pi(H1)
)
dP¯ (0)n (· | x
m, τ = n)
=
(
P¯0(τ = n | x
m)pi(H0 | x
m)
P¯1(τ = n | xm)pi(H1 | xm)
)
·
∫
A
γnP¯
[γn]
0 (· | x
m, τ = n),
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where, for the case m = 0, (∗) follows from (3), which can be verified to be still valid in our generalized
setting. The case m > 0 follows in exactly the same way, by shifting the data by m places (so that the
new x1 becomes what was xm+1, and treating, for k = 0, 1, pi(Hk | x
m) as the priors for this shifted
data problem, and then applying the above with m = 0).
We have shown that the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dP¯
[γn]
1 (·|x
m)
dP¯
[γn]
0 (·|x
m)
at γn is given by γn·
P¯0(τ=n|x
m)pi(H1|x
m)
P¯1(τ=n|xm)pi(H0|xm)
,
which is what we had to show.
Proof. [of Lemma 7] Let A′ denote the event Vn = 1 and Let A ⊂ R>0 be a Borel measurable set.
We can write βn as a function βn(Un). With this notation, we have:
P
[βn]
1,g (A | A
′) =
∫
R>0
1{A} dP
[βn]
1,g (· | A
′)
=
∫
Un
1{βn(Un)∈A} dP
[Un]
1,g (· | A
′) (29)
=
∫
Un
1{βn(Un)∈A}
dP
[Un]
1,g (· | A
′)
dP
[Un]
0,g (· | A
′)
dP
[Un]
1,g (· | A
′)
=
∫
Un
1{βn(Un)∈A}1{A′}
dP
[Un]
1,g (· | A
′)
dP
[Un]
0,g (· | A
′)
dP
[Un]
1,g (· | A
′)
=
∫
Un
1{βn(Un)∈A}1{A′}
P
(n)
0,g (A
′)
P
(n)
1,g (A
′)
dP
[Un]
1,g
dP
[Un]
0,g
dP
[Un]
0,g (· | A
′)
=
P
(n)
0,g (A
′)
P
(n)
1,g (A
′)
·
∫
Un
1{βn(Un)∈A}1{A′}βn(Un) dP
[Un]
0,g (· | A
′) (30)
=
P
(n)
0,g (A
′)
P
(n)
1,g (A
′)
·
∫
Un
1{βn(Un)∈A}βn(Un) dP
[Un]
0,g (· | A
′)
=
P
(n)
0,g (A
′)
P
(n)
1,g (A
′)
·
∫
R>0
1{A}t dP
[βn]
0,g A
′(t),
where step (29) holds because βn is Gn-measurable and ((30)) follows from ((25)). We have shown that
P
(n)
0,g (A
′)
P
(n)
1,g (A
′)
·t is equal to the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dP
[βn]
1,g (·|Vn=1)
dP
[βn]
0,g (·|Vn=1)
, which is what we had to prove.
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